From the standpoint of the United States, modern genomic science began with a land grab, with research organizations patenting isolated sequences (and partial sequences) of DNA upon their discovery, sometimes even before their scientific implications were known. Within the life sciences community, fears quickly emerged that these patents would create an anticommons that would inhibit research; 1 fairly soon it became clear that gene patents would, indeed, interfere with patient care and could slow the development of valuable medical technologies. 2 To some, patent claims over genetic informational content was also regarded as an abridgment of freedom of thought and expression in ways that implicated the Constitution's First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as statutory protections regarding a patient's right to personal medical information. 3 That period is, however, now largely over. With the completion of the Human Genome Project, sequencing human genes has become too routine to patent. 4 Furthermore, the new generation of genetic research and diagnostic practice does not always require the isolation of genes, and thus does not generally infringe claims to isolated sequences. 5 Most important, in a series of four cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the continued existence of a judicial exception to patentability for laws of nature, natural (sometimes only slightly) from those found in nature. 15 These patents may raise the same concerns that were raised in connection with natural phenomena and principles of nature. Other firms are said to be keeping information about natural phenomena and correlations among them as trade secrets. 16 This is a particularly worrisome development as trade secrets arguably interfere even more than patents with dignitary interests and can have their own deleterious effects on research and patient care. 17 Momentum is thus building in many segments of the life sciences community to legislatively expand the scope of patentable subject matter and to reverse the Myriad and Mayo decisions. For example, the Intellectual Property Owner's Association (IPO) and the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) have suggested amending the Patent Act to permit protection of all discoveries, except for claims understood by the ordinary person in the art to 'exist in nature independently' of human activity, or that 'exist[] solely in the human mind'. In the view of these organizations, other provisions of patent law, including the requirements of newness, nonobviousness, and disclosure, will take care of most problematic cases. 18 The American Bar Association (ABA) has made a somewhat similar suggestion: it would expand patentable subject matter unless the right would 'pre-empt the use of others of all practical applications'. 19 These changes pertain only to US law. However, because research and diagnostics can be easily outsourced to places where they can be performed without legal impediment, 20 right holders will want to ensure global exclusivity. Thus, any change in the patentability of products and laws of nature in the United States is likely to find its way into the next rounds of international negotiations on intellectual property protection. 15 See Aboy et al., supra note 9, at 824 (noting that examiners have allowed claims to nucleic acids that differ only slightly from those found in nature; giving the example of adding a fluorescent label). 16 
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The time has therefore arrived to consider sensible ways in which to revise the legal regime: to devise a rule on patentable subject matter that deals with technologies that function as commercial outputs and research inputs and are significant for patient care, and to consider whether changing the scope of patentability also requires rethinking other facets of the patent regime. Proposals such as those made by the IPO, AIPLA, and ABA have been greeted with considerable skepticism on the ground that other provisions of patent law are too difficult and fact-bound to apply as readily as a subject matter exclusion or that the newness, nonobviousness, and disclosure requirements will not be sufficient to deal with the problems that patenting nature presents. 21 Furthermore, concepts like pre-emption and existence in nature or the human mind may be too vague to be applied consistently. 22 Some commentators have therefore looked to the European Patent Convention and the EU Biotech Directive, which offer a more generous approach to gene patents. 23 It is not, however, clear that these rules work well in Europe or that they would readily transfer from a civil law system that includes many specific exceptions to patentability to a common law system that relies on judge-made law. 24 We take a different tack. We compare the situation in the United States with that of Australia. In our view, that comparison is particularly helpful because the Myriad case was litigated to the highest court of Australia at roughly the same time as the case was sub judice in the United States. It was motivated by similar considerations and based on a similar statute, one that is similarly inflected with considerable judicial gloss. Yet the outcomes and impact of the cases appear to be quite different. 25 Using the Australian decision and its aftermath, we identify limiting principles to the bars placed on patenting nature and argue that these limits may be sufficient to permit patenting in areas where the benefits of encouraging life sciences innovation through patenting outweigh the costs. But given the reality that changes in the law are likely to be made, we next consider a remarkable feature of the Australian case, where the Myriad decision made little difference in terms of access to genetic information. We examine the factors in Australian practice that ameliorated the effects of gene patenting prior to the decision 21 in Myriad and suggest ways in which US law could better reflect those factors to create greater certainty for all stakeholders. The paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, we consider the US Myriad decision and its case law progeny, along with PTO guidelines and survey evidence on how these guidelines are applied. For inventions generally drawn to statutory technology, what we see is a two-step approach in which the first step requires the court to consider whether the claim has 'markedly different' characteristics than what is found in nature (or for processes, that they could not be performed using mental steps or critical thinking). If the claim is not different enough, the second step is to ask whether the claim adds 'significantly more'-enough to remove it from the judicial exception. 26 We conclude this approach is not viable. Not only does it fail to provide adequate guidance, 27 the Mayo test makes it difficult to add a diagnostic step as the 'significantly more' that saves a natural product from the patent bar and Myriad makes adding a natural product element insufficient to deal with the bar on patenting principles. 28 Because a third case, Limelight Networks, Inc. v Akamai Techs., Inc.
29 limits the ability of patent holders to successfully assert method claims when the steps in the method are divided among unrelated actors, adding a treatment step may be similarly unavailing whenever the diagnosis and the treatment are performed by different parties. 30 Ironically, and depending on how they are applied, the test may also fail to single out all of the inventions that raise concerns for research and patient care.
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Part II examines the alternative approach in Australia. Here we argue that the factorial test propounded by the Australian High Court, as elaborated in Patent Office guidance, significantly improves decision-making. To be sure, there are not as many cases as there are in the United States, and Australia's 'Mayo moment' occurred in a lower court and has yet to be reviewed by the High Court. Still, we argue that this approach holds considerable appeal. Part III considers what should occur if Congress concludes that the current state of subject matter jurisprudence is not tolerable and expands the reach of patenting to include all technological arts. Here, Australian practice is particularly illuminating. After describing the reasons why patenting did not create a thicket impeding access there, this section discusses the ways in which those practices can be translated into positive law for the United States. 31 See Sherkow, supra note 11, at 1-2 (questioning whether the breadth of patents on certain CRISPR technology is narrow enough to permit research).
556 r Patenting nature tein the gene produces in ways that are associated with early-onset breast and ovarian cancer. A race to characterize the gene ensued; it was won in 1994 by Mark Skolnick, a University of Utah geneticist and cofounder of Myriad Genetics, who quickly moved to patent the isolated gene and its mutations; Skolnick also set up diagnostic testing facilities to detect the sequences in patients. He repeated these efforts a year later, when he found the BRCA2 gene, which is likewise associated with early-onset breast and ovarian cancer, on chromosome 13. 32 For several years after these discoveries, multiple laboratories performed diagnostic tests involving the BRCA genes. However, in 1997 Myriad began to assert its US patents and clear both the diagnostic and research markets; in 2004, it apparently started to keep information on mutations, correlations with cancer risk, and algorithms for interpreting genetic information as trade secrets.
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From a public relations perspective, these actions proved Myriad's undoing. As studies commissioned by the Health and Human Services Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) later found, 34 centralizing genetic testing in a single organization's laboratories eliminated the ability of patients to obtain second opinions (a significant problem for a diagnosis that can lead to surgery to remove breasts and ovaries). Exclusivity also reduced the incentive to improve the tests or keep them current with advances in the underlying science; it also made it impossible to ensure the quality of the existing test by comparing results from different laboratories. 35 Furthermore, privatization led to break downs with insurers (particularly for Medicaid patients), slowed the development of innovative diagnostic technologies, and impeded the ability of researchers to find other genes associated with breast cancer.
Concerned about freedom of speech and the implications of recognizing exclusive rights over genetic knowledge for patients, researchers, and science, the American Civil Liberties Union challenged these patents in 2009, naming as plaintiffs individuals and organizations with varying relationships to the Myriad patents. 36 The complaint sought declarations that 15 patent claims related to BRCA 1 and 2 genes were invalid because they barred learning, thinking, and transmitting genetic information in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and because they are not drawn to statutory subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act, which does not extend to laws of nature, phenomena (products) of nature, and abstract ideas. 37 The challenged claims covered isolated genomic DNA (gDNA, or native DNA) encoding BRCA proteins; complementary DNA, exon sequences encoding these proteins (cDNA, generated in the laboratory to exclude introns, noncoding regions of the DNA); diagnostic tests that compare a 32 DANIEL J. KEVLES, CAN THEY PATENT YOUR GENES, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 7, 2013 patient's sequence to known sequences; and screening tests to determine whether particular therapeutic substances were effective at halting the growth of cells carrying altered BRCA genes. 38 The case was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. But because we question the Court's disposition, the opinions generated along the way bear consideration.
I.A. The Trial Court Decision
The trial court quickly focused on the traditional challenges under the Patent Act, rather than the novel claims sounding in constitutional law. 39 Judge Sweet held the composition claims (to gDNA and cDNA) were not patentable because they were not 'markedly different' from compositions found in nature, as he thought was required by prevailing Supreme Court case law. 40 Particularly crucial to the court was the way in which DNA differed from other chemical compositions. Relying on a statement of Myriad's own expert witness, Joseph Straus, to the effect that 'Genes are of double nature' in that they are both chemicals and carriers of information, 41 the court stressed that:
The information encoded in DNA is not information about its own molecular structure incidental to its biological function, as is the case with adrenaline or other chemicals found in the body. Rather, the information encoded by DNA reflects its primary biological function: directing the synthesis of other molecules in the body-namely, proteins, 'biological molecules of enormous importance' which 'catalyze biochemical reactions' and constitute the 'major structural materials of the animal body'.
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According to the court, isolation, including removal of noncoding regions, did not change that fundamental character. Both cDNA and gDNA were therefore found unpatentable. In addition, the court held that analysis and comparison of DNA sequences, as described in the diagnostic claims, were abstract mental processes that failed to satisfy the then-prevailing view that a machine or physical transformation was the key to patentability. 43 Similarly, it found that the screening claim, which involved comparing the growth rate of cells, was no more than a claim to a scientific method and, as such, was not patentable. 48 Because the isolated gDNA claimed in the patent required cleaving the covalent bonds in the backbone of the native chemical composition, he regarded the claimed DNA as markedly different from the molecule as found in nature. Thus, it was, in his view, patentable. 49 A fortiori, so too was cDNA. 50 Similarly, he considered the cancer screen patent-eligible because it included the concrete steps of growing cells and manipulating them to determine their growth rate and thus was not abstract. 51 Judge Moore concurred, albeit reluctantly on claims to long gDNA strands. Whereas she thought the short strands were patentable because they were not only markedly different from nature, but also had utilities not found in nature, the longer strands had only the differences in the bonding to distinguish them from nature. 52 Writing on a clean slate, Judge Moore would not have found these patentable. However, because she recognized a strong reliance interest in DNA patents, she concurred in the result, leaving it to Congress to determine whether such claims promote or inhibit science.
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Judge Bryson agreed with the others on the disposition regarding cDNA and the method claims. However, he dissented on the patentability of the gDNA claims, arguing that the patents would 'have broad consequences, such as preempting methods for whole-genome sequencing, even though Myriad's contribution to the field is not remotely consonant with such effects'. 54 Further, he was not impressed by the differences relied upon by Judge Lourie because he considered the cleavage of bonds 'necessarily incidental to the extraction of the genes from the environment in which they are found in nature'. 55 He was especially concerned about a claim that he interpreted as covering all isolated DNAs coding for the BRCA1 protein. Noting that it referred to a sequence that was 24,000 nucleotides long with numerous gaps, he argued that:
An almost incalculably large number of new molecules could be created by filling in those gaps with almost any nucleotide sequence, and all of those molecules would fall within the scope of [ 49 Id. at 1352. 50 Id. at 1353. 51 Id. at 1358-59. 52 Id. at 1366-67. 53 Id. at 1371. 54 Id. at 1373. 55 Id. at 1375.
described. Yet those molecules would share only one unifying characteristic: each codes for the same protein as the naturally occurring BRCA1 gene.
56

III.C. The Supreme Court Decision
Given the split decision on the DNA claims, it was not surprising that the Supreme Court agreed to entertain the case. Indeed, in many ways it was primed to hear it. Starting in the early 2000s the Court had become concerned with the impact of patents on scientific and medical advancement. In 2005, it encountered the crabbed way in which the Federal Circuit interpreted a statutory research exemption that permits research 'related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs'. 57 In Merck v Integra, the Court, recognizing the value of experimentation in developing new therapies, reversed the Federal Circuit's holding that only clinical research is covered by the exemption. 58 At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged that the exemption did not extend to 'basic scientific research'. 59 The next Term, in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lab.Corp. v Metabolite (Metabolite), a case about the subject matter eligibility of a diagnostic test, Justice Breyer opined that 'sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection'. 60 Bilski v Kappos, which barred patents on abstract principles, followed in 2010.
More important, soon after the Federal Circuit's decision in Myriad, the Court reviewed a case that raised the Metabolite issue concerning diagnostics. As foreshadowed by Justice Breyer's dissent in Metabolite, in Mayo the Court invalidated a patent on a method for determining whether a patient was receiving the correct dose of a drug. 61 The Court reasoned that a claim to a relationship between dose and effect is a natural law; when such a claim includes no more than 'well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field', the claim ties up use of the underlying law, which can 'inhibit future innovation' premised on the law's use, including, in the Mayo case, 'the development of more refined treatment recommendations'. 62 Thus, the Court concluded, claims stating laws of nature that do not include an 'inventive concept' in the application of the law are unpatentable.
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Because Mayo was handed down after the Federal Circuit's decision in the Myriad case, the Court's first step in reviewing Myriad was to ask the Federal Circuit to reconsider its decision in light of Mayo. 64 Oddly, however, Mayo barely played a role in any of the subsequent Myriad decisions. On remand, Judge Lourie dismissed Mayo as solely 56 Id. at 1376. 57 concerned with the preemption of laws of nature; 65 Judge Moore stuck to her previous views even though she claimed to consider Mayo applicable; 66 Judge Bryson did not mention the decision at all-and, surprisingly, the Supreme Court barely referenced it in its plenary review. 67 Instead, the Supreme Court started off by conceptualizing Myriad's invention much as Judge Sweet did, downplaying DNA's character as a molecular structure (as Justice Thomas put it, 'Myriad's claims are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition' 68 ) and stressing its informational content (the 'claim is concerned primarily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the specific chemical composition of a particular molecule' 69 ). The Court did not, however, reach the same conclusion as Judge Sweet. Rather than focus on the question whether information directing the synthesis of proteins is patentable subject matter, the Court relied on the distinction between natural and artificial creation. Because it considered the gDNA naturally occurring, it held it unpatentable. Since the cDNA was synthesized, the Court found it to be statutory subject matter.
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The natural/artificial distinction is not, however, satisfying as a theoretical matter or helpful as legal guidance. Once the Court recognized the biological functioning of DNA sequences, it is difficult to understand how it could distinguish between cDNA and gDNA as both encode the identical information. Both raise the problem of inhibiting science, which was the focus of Justice Breyer's concern in Metabolite. Moreover, the ownership of what are essentially biological instructions-whether embodied in gDNA or cDNA-ties up principles about the relationships among the nucleotides comprising DNA and the protein chains these nucleotides produce. Since these relationships are at least as fundamental to future innovation as the laws at issue in Mayo, it would seem that the cDNA claims should be equally vulnerable to invalidation. (Indeed, the informational nature of DNA-the extent to which it encodes a biological process-is arguably why the Court's initial intuition in Myriad was to remand it in light of Mayo.
71 ) The decision has other problematic features. Although the Court found cDNA patentable, it recognized that sometimes native sequences do not contain noncoding regions. Because such strands 'may be indistinguishable from natural DNA', Justice Thomas opined that they are not patentable. 72 Conversely, the Court noted that '[i]n rare instances, a side effect of a viral infection of a cell can be the random incorporation of fragments of the resulting cDNA, known as a pseudogene, into the genome'. Since the Court thought these so-called pseudogenes 'serve no purpose', it held such strands are patentable. 73 In other words, cDNA is patentable except when it isn't, while gDNA is not patentable except when it is. Because detecting these special situations may not 65 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 66 Id. at 1339-40. 67 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 586, 589 & 594 n.7 (2013). 68 Id. at 2118. 69 Id. 70 Id. at 2118-19. 71 Cf. Burk, supra note 11, at 506 (pointing out the curious nature of the remand), 516 (conceiving of informational molecules as embodying the process that leads to a product-in other words, the embodiment of a principle). 72 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2119 (2013). 73 Id. at 2119 n. 8. be easy (and because science may someday identify a use for pseudogenes), these exceptions create an element of unpredictability for other gene-related patents.
Even more worrisome is the difficulty in determining the patentability of other substances that are based on nature, such as venoms isolated from animals and used in research on alleviating pain, unmutated genes introduced into patients to stimulate the development of normal proteins, antibodies produced by rats and then treated so that they are close enough to human antibodies to withstand rejection, or proteins and kinases that are used in the development of therapies. Since the Court never explained why it ignored the cleaved bonds that were so important to Judge Lourie, it is not clear how far a synthetic molecule must depart from its naturally occurring analog to be considered patentable. The humanized rat antibody is one illustration of the difficulty; another is Dan Burk's example of a peptide nucleic acid, which is entirely artificial yet carries the same sequence information as DNA. 74 Furthermore, because the Court never relied on the differences that Judge Moore had pointed out in the ways in which short (as opposed to long) strands of DNA can be used, and because gDNA and cDNA include the same instructions on making proteins, functional changes do not appear to be a key feature of the analysis. Nor is it clear that the inventiveness of the synthesis will matter. Because Mayo was not, in the end, important to the decision in Myriad, arguably Mayo's methodology, and its reliance on an inventive concept, is irrelevant to decisions about the patentability of phenomena of nature. 75 And that is possibly true even though the case after Mayo, Alice v CLS Bank (Alice), emphasized that when a claim is drawn to a judicial exception, patentability is saved only when there is 'an "inventive concept"-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself'. 76 Certainly, the Myriad Court did not bother to look for such a concept: Justice Thomas never asked whether generating cDNA is a 'well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field', as Mayo required. and Mayo, the guidelines (and now the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure) apply the Mayo approach to all subject matter eligibility issues. They instruct examiners to determine whether claims are directed to a statutory category (Step 1). For a claim that is within a statutory category, the examiner must next decide whether it is directed to a judicial exception (for life sciences, a law of nature or a natural phenomenon) or is 'markedly different' from the exception (Step 2A). If it is not different, the examiner must then determine whether there are elements in the claim, alone or in combination, that add 'significantly more' than the judicial exception, elements that amount to more than a well-understood, routine convention activity in the relevant art (Step 2B).
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IV.D. The Aftermath
From the new life-sciences examples that accompany the 2016 guidelines, it is clear that as far as the PTO is concerned, Step 2A is the more critical. The examples include two products derived directly from nature. The first (Example 28, a vaccine) comprises seven claims, six of which the PTO considers patent-eligible. Of those, five are regarded as patent eligible because they cover material that is 'markedly different' under Step 2A; in only one case is eligibility dependent on a finding that 'significantly more' was added per Step 2B. Claim 30 (a sweetener) includes six claims. Four are considered patenteligible, all because they are 'markedly different' from nature under step 2A. For diagnostics, the analysis is similar. In Example 31, which is based on the Myriad case, three of the five claims are considered patentable because they are 'markedly different' from a natural law or a mental act (Step 2A); only one is eligible because nonconventional activity added 'significantly more' (Step 2B). While four of the seven claims in Example 29 (diagnosis and treatment of a hypothetical disease) are considered patent-eligible under Step 2B, still there are two claims in this example that pass muster because of Step 2A. Had the PTO considered Step 2B equally determinative, it would presumably have offered more examples of how to use it.
The importance of Step 2A is even more evident in the Federal Circuit case law. Of the nearly 100 cases listed by the PTO as of May 3, 2018, only 10 can be classified as involving laws or products of nature. 79 Of these, in only three was the patent upheld-tellingly, two on the ground that it was not directed at a patent-ineligible concept (Step 2A, which confusingly, the court calls Step 1). 80 Patent holders forced to the second step thus mostly lost. Of the cases involving abstract ideas, the patent holder prevailed in 10; seven because of Step 2A (aka Step 1), two on Step 2B; in the last case, there is considerable ambiguity (and a dissent) as to how the court decided the claims were statutory subject matter. 81 It is, in short, much harder for the patentee to win once Since the test now requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the activity is conventional, it may become easier for issued patents to survive the second step.
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Still, the near-dispositive nature of the first step in the analysis of life sciences cases is not difficult to understand: it is not evident what the second step, which looks for 'significantly more', actually means. Following Berkheimer, the PTO issued a memorandum that attempts to clarify the analysis. It instructs examiners that the facts must show not simply that the activity was known or obvious, but that it was 'widely prevalent or in common use in the relevant industry'. 84 Further, it states that if the activity constitutes several elements, they must be examined both individually and in combination. Whether the Supreme Court will approve this approach is an open question and the PTO has asked for public comments.
85 So far, the Office appears willing to accept as 'substantially more' anything not already widely known, including material known, but not for the particular application recited in the claim; 86 or known and used by only a few scientists; or methods nonconventional at the time of the application, even if after the date of invention or application, they became routine. 87 It has not, however, come 86 See eg Subject Matter Examples, supra note 78 , Example 29, Claim 3 ('use of porcine antibodies in veterinary therapeutics was known to most scientists in the field. But significantly, there is no evidence that porcine antibodies were routinely or conventionally used to detect human proteins such as JUL-1') and Claim 5 ('Vitamin D was known to doctors, and was routinely and conventionally used as an oral supplement to maintain bone health prior to applicant's invention, and at the time the application was filed. However, mere knowledge of vitamin D or its use in other ways to treat other medical conditions does not make the administration of topical vitamin D to treat julitis a conventional step that those in this field would routinely practice. The evaluation turns on whether the use of topical vitamin D was widely prevalent in the field at the time the invention was made and the application was filed.'). 87 Id., Example 31, Claim 80 ('Although Cool-Melt PCR was used by a few scientists in the field to amplify nucleic acids at the time the invention was made and the application was filed, use by only a few scientists does not make the technique routine or conventional in the field as a whole. Nor does it matter that at a later time, Cool-Melt PCR became a routine and conventional technique. Instead, the evaluation turns on whether 564 r Patenting nature down on another issue splitting the Federal Circuit: whether the 'significantly more' must be explicitly claimed or whether it is enough that it appears in the specification.
88
It is also difficult to win under the second step because, as two of the life sciences cases demonstrate, the 'significantly more' cannot involve something that is itself patent-ineligible. Thus, in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v Sequenom, Inc., the inventors had discovered that paternally inherited cell-free fetal DNA (cff DNA) circulates in a pregnant woman's blood and they found ways to detect it and use it to determine fetal characteristics. Although the test represents a major breakthrough in prenatal care, cffDNA is a natural phenomenon and so fails to meet the requirement of Step 2A. The diagnosis is a law of nature and therefore cannot save the invention under Step 2B. 89 Similarly, in Cleveland Clinic Found. v True Health Diagnostics LLC, 90 a diagnostic based on the correlation between an enzyme, myeloperoxidase (MPO), and cardiovascular disease is ineligible under Step 2A because it is a law of nature; MPO is naturally occurring so detecting it, as required by the claims, does not add enough 'more' to save the diagnostic's patentability.
It is also possible that courts (and the PTO) are reluctant to rely heavily on
Step 2B because that test may not serve anyone's purposes. For the patent holder, 'significantly more' is basically a limitation that can make the patent easy to invent around. In particular, some of the PTO's examples of patentable subject matter include, as the nonconventional addition, activity that could be performed by a party different from the one using the patent-ineligible concept. For instance, Claim 5 in Example 29 adds to a diagnostic step involving a law of nature, a treatment step ('administering an effective amount of topical vitamin D to the diagnosed patient') that saves the diagnostic from being considered unpatentable. However, if the treatment is not administered by the entity that conducted the diagnosis, then all the steps recited in the patent will not have been performed by the same party. Unless there is a close enough relationship among them to meet the test set out in Limelight Networks, Inc. v Akamai Techs., Inc., 91 as interpreted by the Federal Circuit 92 -a circumstance that those using the invention will likely endeavor to avoid-there will be no one who can be regarded as an infringer.
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Nor is it clear that Step 2B will benefit the public by freeing fundamental processes for use in follow-on innovation. Although the PTO examples are aimed at identifying the use of Cool-Melt PCR to amplify nucleic acids was actually routinely or conventionally used by scientists in this field at the time the invention was made and the application was filed.'). 88 Patenting nature r 565
features that 'meaningfully limit the claim[s]', 94 meaningfulness is a slippery standard. In particular, allowing patentability to turn on a step that later becomes conventional will surely hamper future actors.
Putting the emphasis on Step 2A may, however, actually make patent eligibility even harder to predict. In the case of abstractions (the bulk of the Federal Circuit case law), a key problem is choosing the level of generality at which to describe the claim. 95 The more abstract, the less there is left to consider when determining whether there is something 'markedly different' about the claim. For the law of nature cases, there is an analogous problem in that the analysis requires the identification of the law of nature. Whether the claim is markedly different depends on how the decision-maker conceptualizes the law. For example, the law in Mayo was about how a patient metabolizes a pharmaceutical. Since the drug was artificially introduced into the body, it is a law of nature only if that term is broadly conceived.
In the abstraction cases, imprecision in the starting point of the analysis leads to the result that claims said to be improvements (or enhancements) are far more likely to be considered patent-eligible, for the focus on the improvement persuades the court that the advance is different from the underlying concept. 96 That dynamic may be true of the life sciences cases as well. Consider, for example, Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v CellzDirect, Inc. 97 The invention was a method of preserving hepatocytes (a type of liver cell). The trial court found the advance unpatentable because it was directed to the law of nature that hepatocytes are capable of surviving multiple freeze-thaw cycles. The Federal Circuit reversed on a finding that the claims 'are directed to a new and useful method of preserving hepatocytes'-one that involved an improvement over the basic freeze-andthaw technique in that it required freezing and thawing the cells at least two times. Yet it is unclear why the district court was wrong. Why is a better survival through double freezing not itself a law of nature? Aside from the predictability problem, this approach elevates the role of drafting, in direct contravention to one of the Supreme Court's concerns in Mayo. 98 Similarly, in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v West-Ward Pharmaceuticals, Ltd, the court emphasized that the advance was a 'new way of using an existing drug', and found it patentable even though the 'new way' was, as in Mayo, based on how the patient responded to the treatment. For claims to products, the issue is somewhat different. There, Step 2A requires a comparison between the claimed subject matter and material found in nature. That, in turn, requires the identification of a basis for the comparison. 100 As Brad Sherman has pointed out, in Myriad, the comparison could have been between the instructions in the cDNA and the instructions in the gDNA, but that was not the comparison the Court made. Although the Court ignored the covalent bonds that influenced Judge Lourie, it still followed his approach of comparing molecular compositions. Thus, it found that eliminating the noncoding regions of the DNA made cDNA different enough to patent.
101 Furthermore, as we saw, the Court ignored pseudogenes, even though they are found in nature. 102 An even more significant problem is that the concept of 'markedly' in 'markedly different' is not defined by the case law, so it is not clear how different the claim must be from the thing to which it is compared. In re Roslin, 103 which involved the patentability of a cloned sheep, furnishes an example. In holding the sheep was not patentable subject matter because it was identical to a sheep found in nature, the court was unimpressed by differences in mitochondrial DNA or the effect of the environment on the cloned sheep's genotype and physical characteristics. 104 Furthermore, some claims cover multiple embodiments. In those cases, presumably every embodiment must be different from what occurs in nature, yet it is unlikely that every embodiment can be identified and compared to nature. There are also claims that are drawn to a combination of known elements: is it enough that the combination does not occur naturally, or must the combination also create functional differences in the final product? 105 Finally, there is a degree of fluidity as to what about the claim makes it 'markedly different' and what constitutes 'significantly more'. Thus, the cases do not always clearly differentiate between eligibility by reason of Step 2A or 2B. 106 Sometimes the Federal Circuit backs up a finding on the first step with a finding on the second.
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The bottom line is that it is now extremely difficult to know how to successfully protect advances in the life sciences. Kathy Liddell and her co-authors surveyed patent applications published between June 2010 and June 2013 which included at least one claim to a simple isolated gene sequence. They found that inventors have tried eight different prosecution strategies to differentiate their advances from phenomena of nature. 108 examiner in question thought was or wasn't found in nature. 109 In some cases, the authors questioned whether the differences claimed in the issued patents were 'markedly different'. For example, they found that examiners have allowed claims to nucleic acids that differ only slightly from those found in nature, giving the example of adding a fluorescent label. 110 They also noted interexaminer variability on the issue and were skeptical as to whether the issued patents provided significant coverage. 111 Similarly, Alan Miller and Brian Amos reviewed 100 diagnostic method patents and found several different claiming strategies (depending, in part on when the applications were filed). They found that the claims most likely to issue were those that included several steps, used a specific agent in the diagnosis, included a treatment step, or avoided the term 'diagnosis'. 112 Like Liddell, they were concerned about the consistency of examination across the examiner corps and the enforceability of the patents that issued.
In a sense, it is difficult to fathom how outcomes could be other than haphazard. Concepts like 'markedly different' and 'significantly more' can distinguish what is patentable from what is not only if accompanied by a metric for what counts as 'marked' or 'significant'. That requires a theory for why a difference from nature is required at all. While it is clear that the Supreme Court became interested in the question of patentable subject matter out of a concern about inhibiting future innovation, that apprehension appears to have dropped out of the equation. In Myriad, Justice Thomas did not distinguish among claims that specified all the nucleotides in the sequence and those that included many unknown regions, even though Judge Bryson pointed out how much broader the latter claims were. Nor did he adopt Judge Moore's suggestion of thinking about long strands with no difference in functionality from nature differently from short strands, which had very articulable (and possibly narrow) functionalities. Most important, the Court never considered whether the artificiality of cDNA would make rights over it any less chilling of future research than rights over gDNA.
The failure to consider preemption can be attributed directly to Mayo, where the Court conceded that the law of nature at issue in the case-the relationship between a metabolite of a drug and the appropriate dose of that drug-was extremely narrow and had limited application.
113 By nonetheless finding the claims unpatentable, the decision implied that preemption was not the sole concern. That said, the Mayo Court still noted that future work ('the development of more refined treatment recommendations' 114 ) could be inhibited by the patent and in Alice, the Court emphasized the preemption point. 115 Thus, the analysis of whether a claim is different enough or adds sufficiently more should turn, at least in part, on whether the difference or addition is such that the quences, (iv) amending to labeled nucleic acids, (v) amending to a nucleic acid in a vector, (vi) amending to a nucleic acid recombined with a nonspecific regulatory sequence, (vii) amending with a type 2 change and a negative claim clause, and (viii) amending to a nucleic acid so short that it does not naturally occur) 109 Id. at 823-24. 110 Id. at 824. 111 Id. at 825. 112 claim preempts activity related to what the inventor discovered. Indeed, some judges on the Federal Circuit appear to be approaching the problem this way. While some are using what Judge Plager calls the common law method of comparing new cases with the disposition in older ones, 116 other jurists have tied the analysis to the goal of 'maintain[ing] the incentive of "some future inventor, in the onward march of science" to discover new ways of achieving the same result more cheaply and efficiently than has the patentee.'
117 Similarly, while the court applies the Mayo two-step as its primary analytical tool, it tends to sneak a peek at the preemptive effect of the claims it upholds. For example, in CellzDirect the Court stated that [W] hile pre-emption is not the test for determining patent-eligibility, it is certainly the concern that undergirds ... § 101 jurisprudence. Here, while not resting our opinion on them, we note the district court's findings that the '929 patent 'does not lock up the natural law in its entirety' and that 'LTC has already managed to engineer around the patent'. These findings accord with our conclusion that the patent is not "directed to" a patentineligible building block of human ingenuity. 118 To the extent that the § 101 analysis would be improved by adding to the test as currently articulated a concern for preemption, the question is how to determine what is too preemptive to patent. Judges Bryson and Moore offered a few clues, as has one of us in previous work. 119 For more, we turn to Australia. . 119 Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 21 (suggesting four factors: the ability to invent around, the need for interoperability, the breadth of the prospects, and the identity of the inventor).
II. THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION: D'ARCY, CARGILL AND MORE
II.A. D'Arcy v Myriad
gene'. This patent application was filed on August 11, 1995 and the granted patent expired on August 11, 2015, almost two months before the decision in D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics, Inc (D'Arcy) was handed down by the High Court. The challenge to Patent 686,004 was directed to three disputed claims (of the 30 total in the patent), which included claims to isolated gDNA, and cDNA coding for identified mutations or polymorphisms. 121 Unlike the Myriad decision, the Australian courts were not required to consider claims relating to methods of diagnosis, whether methods of comparing DNA sequences against those with known mutations, or screening tests. 122 Prior to D'Arcy, the patentability of isolated DNA sequences in Australia had not been called into question. The practice of the Australian Patent Office was that isolating DNA sequences from their natural environment was enough to make them patentable subject matter.
The Australian courts in D'Arcy were required to consider whether the claims constituted patentable subject matter or, specifically, a manner of manufacture, as required by s 18(1) of the Patents Act 1990. This provides a threshold requirement: an invention must be a 'manner of manufacture' within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623. The Australian Patents Act 1990 is one of very few patent statutes to retain this requirement from the first patent statute in the common law. Its inclusion signifies broad judicial discretion to determine whether an invention is within the bounds of patentable subject matter. Prior to D'Arcy, the High Court stated in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (NRDC), 123 the seminal case dealing with the manner of manufacture requirement, that it does not qualify for precise formulation. Rather, the relevant question is: 'Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have been developed for the application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?' 124 In NRDC, The High Court held that on the facts of the case this requirement was satisfied because the subject matter in issue was (1) an artificially created state of affairs that (2) had economic utility. 125 This two-limbed test became entrenched as the accepted test for patentability under Australian law, attaining, as some commentators have argued, the status of a rigidly applied 'rule'. 126 At first instance, Justice Nicholas 127 in the Federal Court of Australia upheld the validity of the disputed claims. His Honor found that the claims in question were to isolated nucleic acids (gDNA), and that this isolated gDNA and its counterpart cDNA were structurally different to naturally occurring sequences. 128 There was no requirement for any change in chemical composition of the isolated sequences, rather, the fact 570 r Patenting nature of their isolation was sufficient to create an artificially created state of affairs. 129 The second limb, that of economic utility, was not in issue.
On appeal, the Full Federal Court upheld Justice Nicholson's decision. Justices Dowsett, Kenny, Bennett, and Middleton held that the isolated product was not only structurally different, but also functionally different to the naturally occurring product. 130 In other words, the Full Federal Court took a slightly different approach from that of Justice Nicholson in finding that the isolated sequence did in fact differ to the naturally occurring sequence. 131 In this respect, the Full Federal Court was influenced by the judgments of Judges Moore and Lourie in the US series of cases.
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Yvonne D'Arcy was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. Although unanimously holding that the claims in question did not fall within the concept of patentable subject matter, the High Court gave three separate judgments. Most relevant for present purposes is the judgment of the plurality, Chief Justice French and Justices Kiefel, Bell, and Keane. The plurality returned attention to the NRDC formulation, reiterating that it is not a rigid test. 133 They confirmed that, in many instances, the two-limb test will suffice to determine whether an invention satisfies the manner of manufacture requirement, but where claims fall outside the established boundaries of subject matter, it becomes necessary to turn to a range of other factors as well.
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In the case of isolated DNA sequences, the plurality concluded that the two-limb test was not satisfied in that there was no 'artificially created state of affairs' as required by the first limb. 135 The basis of the plurality's finding was that the sequence claims were to information. 136 Although there were chemical, structural, and functional differences in the isolated (as compared with the natural) sequences, it was the information stored in them that was the essential element of the invention as claimed. The claims relied in no way on the changes in chemical composition resulting from isolation; 137 thus, there was nothing 'artificially created'. 138 In the words of the plurality, the information was 'discerned' not 'made'. 139 Because the claimed invention fell into what it regarded as a new class of subject matter, the plurality expounded a nonexhaustive list of factors to be taken into consideration:
1. whether patentability would be consistent with the purposes of the Act and, in particular: 1.1 whether the invention as claimed, if patentable under s 18(1)(a) could give rise to a large new field of monopoly protection with potentially negative effects on innovation; 1.2 whether the invention as claimed if patentable under s 18(1)(a) could, because of the content of the claims, have a chilling effect on activities beyond those formally the subject of the exclusive rights granted to the patentee; 1.3 whether to accord patentability to the invention as claimed would involve the court in assessing important and conflicting public and private interests and purposes; 2. whether to accord patentability to the invention as claimed would enhance or detract from the coherence of the law relating to inherent patentability; 3. relevance to Australia's place in the international community of nations:
3.1 Australia's obligations under international law; 3.2 the patent laws of other countries; and 4. whether to accord patentability to the class of invention as claimed would involve law-making of a kind which should be done by legislature.
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Of these factors, the plurality considered 3, 4, and 6 to be of primary importance.
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As noted, their Honors had already found that the claims were to information and were therefore not made, but they also considered the other enunciated factors. They placed particular importance on the fact that allowing the patent could have a chilling effect on innovation, given the odd consequence that '... the patent could be infringed without the infringer being aware of that fact' and the significant, unquantified size of the class of isolated sequences. 142 The plurality reached the same conclusion in respect of cDNA which bears the same characteristics as gDNA in that it '... is synthesized but replicates a naturally occurring sequence of events'.
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II.B. Patent Office Practice Post-D'Arcy
From the outset, the repercussions of the D'Arcy decision were simultaneously welcomed, 144 derided, and hotly debated. 145 Shortly after the decision was handed down, IP Australia (which houses the Australian Patent Office) issued a draft Examination Practice. 146 After a period of public consultation and deliberation, changes to the Manual of Practice and Procedure were implemented. 147 The resulting Practice Note states that isolated nucleic acid sequences (gDNA) are not patent-eligible subject matter. 148 It also precludes from patent-eligibility cDNA and synthetic nucleotide sequences, probes, and primers and isolated interfering/inhibitory nucleotide sequences that merely replicate genetic information of naturally occurring organisms. 149 This aspect of the Practice Note relies on the plurality's judgment that any full or partial sequence that replicates a naturally occurring sequence constitutes information and is not patentable. 150 The potential breadth of this finding by the High Court has been disputed: for example, some commentators have asserted the High Court's finding should be interpreted narrowly, rendering cDNA sequences ineligible only where a corresponding claim to gDNA would be ineligible. 151 However, the Practice Note appears to interpret it more broadly and preclude any DNA sequence from patentability where it replicates a naturally occurring sequence.
A number of Patent Office decisions have provided the potential to consider the import of the Practice Note (and D'Arcy itself) in the context of sequence information. 152 Although none of them has been particularly illuminating, taken together they suggest that, in practice, IP Australia is interpreting the impact of the D'Arcy case cautiously. In Cargill Incorporated v Dow Agro Sciences LLC, 153 the patent eligibility of a fungal sequence was confirmed on the basis that the inventors had codon-optimized the sequence, differentiating it from the naturally occurring sequence. 154 According to the decision-maker in this matter (a Delegate of the Commissioner of Patents), this subject matter was not near the boundaries of patentability and thus did not invoke consideration of the additional D'Arcy factors. 155 A similar result was reached in CSIRO v BASF. 156 In Arrowhead Research Corporation, 157 the generation of target RNA sequences was found by the Delegate to be an important element of the claimed invention, but not the substance of the invention. Instead, the substance of the invention was a pharmaceutical composition comprising interfering RNA because the particular nucleotide sequences claimed were not critical to the invention, rather the capacity provided by the invention to identify specific target sequences was.
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II.D. Lessons for US Practice
While it may well be true that the decision in Cargill will be reviewed by higher Australian courts and modified (if not reversed), Justice Beach's interpretation of D'Arcy, coupled with the guidelines set out by IP Australia, offers one intuitive way forward in dealing with the problems identified earlier in the aftermath of the US decisions in Mayo and Myriad. This approach furnishes an analytical technique that avoids the problems in the two-step Mayo test of determining when a difference is marked, deciding what constitutes significantly more, and finding an inventive concept. In contrast to a recent decision of the US Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which invalidated a patent on a method for using SNPs to breed cows, 186 Justice Beach managed, even after D'Arcy, to retain the availability of patents to encourage valuable new inventions in the life sciences arena, in this case, one with potential to improve nutrition. He did so in three ways.
First, he regarded invention in traditional ('plain vanilla') subject areas-places where society has not heretofore experienced significant difficulty with patent rights-as the proper subject matter of patenting. To deal with the abstractness problem that concerned the Supreme Court in Alice and the breadth issue that worried Judge Bryson in Myriad-claims which, as the D'Arcy Court put it, one could inadvertently infringe-he deployed other patentability requirements. In US parlance, he required the applicant to supply more information under the rubrics of enablement and distinct claiming. 187 Of course, it remains to be seen whether the patent retains value once the applicant makes the required amendments.
Second, to the extent Justice Beach saw himself as dealing with an area where patenting is new-areas where early insights are likely to be fundamental and where rights could, in Justice Breyer's words, impede rather than promote progress-Justice Beach considered the factorial test. He was able to use this approach to look directly at the problem of chilling future innovation instead of, as in CellzDirect, peeking at preemption after struggling with a test that is difficult to apply, not well correlated with the concern, and easily influenced by how a claim is drafted. Thus, while we take Professor Lawson's point that, once the D'Arcy court decided genes were not man-made, the factorial test might be considered dictum, we see it as a way to deal with modern technologies that lie close to fundamental scientific principles (so called dual-use technologies) or with the sort of inventions that Dan Burk has identified as troubling because they are communicative in nature. 188 The factorial test draws attention to the concerns attendant to patenting in these areas and requires courts (and patent offices) to engage with the social and proprietary implications of either granting or denying exclusive rights. (As we will argue later, identifying these borderline cases can also be useful to determine the scope of defenses, should the patent be enforced.) In some ways this approach is similar to the suggestion made by Dennis Crouch and Robert Merges that subject matter eligibility should be considered only after other criteria for patentability are evaluated. 189 Third, Justice Beach appreciated the difference between attempts to privatize pure communicative material (or as the courts call it, information), 190 by claiming the medium in which it is embedded, as opposed to a concrete implementation of that material in a way that can improve social welfare. This is illustrated by the way that he dealt with the two product claims in issue in Cargill, a claim to an isolated DNA sequence (claim 13) and a claim to a cloned bovine (claim 11), both resulting from methods also claimed in the patent. The sequence claim was rejected as within the bar created by D'Arcy. 191 In contrast, Justice Beach found the claim to the cloned animal to be patentable subject matter. He did not stop with the similarities between the clone and its mother, as the Federal Circuit did in Roslin, nor did he attempt to decide whether differences in epigenetics or mitochondria were marked or significant enough. Instead he reasoned:
Now of course the cloned cow in one sense is the same as that which it clones. MLA says superficially that it is 'mere genetic information on a grander scale' and accordingly Myriad is directly applicable. The submission has a superficial allure, but I reject it. An artificial object of economic significance is produced for its own sake, not merely as a receptacle for its informational content.
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To be sure, much as this approach presents a valuable way to preserve patentability in areas where incentives are important and concerns around exclusivity are not paramount, it would be somewhat difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court's pronouncements. But as noted earlier, the distinction Justice Thomas drew in Myriad between man-made and artificial is not as sharp as he maintained. As Judge Lourie argued, isolated gDNA involves broken bonds and is thus somewhat artificial (especially when the claimed fragments possess the sorts of functions Judge Moore described). At the same time, when it is only the exons (coding sequences) that matter, cDNA cannot be considered man-made. In short, supplementary factors will always be necessary to separate patentable and unpatentable subject matter-arguably, that is why the PTO, the Federal Circuit, and the Alice Court ignored the Myriad Court's failure to cite Mayo and instead have relied on its two-step analysis for all subject matter challenges. The factors used in the Australian decisions can be regarded as providing the missing metric for deciding what is different enough from nature to be considered protectable. And, as Crouch and Merges and many commentators have pointed out, reliance on other patentability factors-enablement, written description, distinct claiming, nonobviousness, utility, and novelty-will often be enough to filter out subject matter that should 189 Crouch & Merges, supra note 21. 190 not be patented. 193 It would mark quite a shift in Australian jurisprudence, however, if these supplementary factors are considered after the other patentability factors. Patent eligibility has traditionally been considered to be a threshold question.
We may already be seeing the Federal Circuit move in a similar direction, one more hospitable to patenting material drawn to nature. Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v West-Ward Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. (Vanda), which was decided in April 2018, involved a method for treating schizophrenia based on a patient's genotype. 194 A representative claim included a step to determine (or have determined) the patient's genotype from a biological sample, and then administering an amount of iloperidone that is dependent on whether the patient is genetically inclined to be a poor metabolizer. The method is based on the natural relationship between the P450 2D6 gene and an enzyme that is known to metabolize many drugs, including iloperidone. Nevertheless, the court did not reject the patent as a law of nature, barred by Mayo. Instead, like Justice Beach, Judge Lourie confined Mayo to its facts. Since the Mayo claims 'were not directed to a novel method of treating a disease', he held that Vanda 'is not Mayo'. 195 That said, as in Cargill, the court went on to consider the Mayo factors and found the claim was patent-eligible under Step 1 (the PTO's 2A). 196 In addition, it determined that the claim was not preemptive because it did not tie up subsequent treatment decisions. 197 Tellingly, Judge Prost's dissent called attention to the ways in which the decision departs from Mayo and the court's former understanding of how it applies. 198 But this approach has the advantage of opening opportunities to patent in areas that hold considerable promise, including as in this case, personalized medicine.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF E XPANDING THE RE ACH OF PATENTABLE
SUBJECT MATTER The US patent community has not reacted to the subject-matter eligibility cases in the same way as Justice Beach did by advocating for a more refined and nuanced analysis of the distinction between eligibility and noneligibility. While USPTO Director Andrei Iancu noted the difficulties in applying current law and concluded that '[s]omething must be done', 199 the bar appears to have little patience with improving the definitions of 'markedly different' and 'significantly more' or with leavening the analysis with technical filters, as in In Re Fisher, 200 or relying more on the nonobviousness inquiry set out in KSR International Co. v Teleflex, Inc. 201 Instead, the consensus seems to be that the 'something' must be a dramatic expansion of patentable subject matter. As we saw earlier, various influential organizations such as the IPO, the AIPLA, and the ABA have recommended that Congress amend the Patent Act to vastly expand the scope of patentable subject matter. 202 Should that occur, the question arises as to what will happen to the concerns voiced in the Supreme Court subject matter cases and, almost more important, the patient access problems that animated the Myriad case in the first place. Immediately after Myriad, patient access to BRCA diagnostics improved rapidly. Two firms (Ambry and Gene-by-Gene) immediately entered the market and lowered costs. Thereafter, other, more efficient, forms of testing (such as testing of multiple genes simultaneously) were made available. 203 Surely, the goal cannot be to roll back the potential for these developments. Rather, we argue that Justice Breyer's admonition that 'sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the Progress of Science," should be understood in the context in which it was made, as a reaction to cases limiting the scope of the experimental use defense. 204 Thus, it should be interpreted not as advocating fewer patents (the upshot of Myriad and Mayo), but rather as suggesting that the protection offered by a patent should be tempered by defenses that promote other values. Prior to Myriad, SACGHS had recommended the creation of exemptions from patent infringement for use of genetic tests for patient care purposes and for use of patent-protected DNA sequences for research purposes. 205 Although the America Invents Act of 2011 did not include these proposals, it did expressly require the Director of the Patent and Trademarks Office to conduct a study into second opinion testing. 206 The Report advised caution and made recommendations concerning data sharing and testing. 207 However, in light of the Supreme Court subject matter decisions, the study became largely irrelevant. But should the legislature overrule these cases, it must also consider changes along the lines recommended by SACGHS. Once again, the United States can learn a great deal from Australia.
III.A. Australian Practice
As noted above, GTG had taken steps in 2003 and 2008 to assert the BRCA patents against public laboratories and research bodies that were performing BRCA testing. 208 willing to pay. Moreover, while the public laboratories are competitors of patent holders like GTG, they are also their customers, in that they do the bulk of the genetic testing. 218 Finally, patent holders know that the government can always send samples abroad for testing. Indeed, in Australia there is an increasing reliance (albeit still small) on foreign laboratories. 219 There are other dynamics under Australian patent law that influence access to fundamental biomedical patents. Prior to April 16, 2012, when the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth) (Raising the Bar Act) came into effect, there was no express exemption from infringement for experimental use in the Australian Patents Act 1990 and no judicial precedents indicating that such an exemption existed at common law. 220 The Raising the Bar Act introduced a limited research exemption into Australian law via s 119C of the Patents Act 1990. 221 The research exemption in s 119C protects a person from infringing a patent for an invention where an act is done that would infringe a patent, provided it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention (often referred to as an exemption for 'research on' the subject matter of the invention, as opposed to 'research with' this subject matter). 222 The stated intention of this provision was '... to give broad and clear protection to research and experimental activities in order to maximise the potential for research in Australia'. 223 However, its scope and effect are yet to be clearly determined. It is particularly unclear as to how the exemption will apply to gene patents. It is not intended to protect use of patented research tools. 224 Nor would it cover diagnostic testing. Despite its limited reach in relation to 'public good' uses, it would, however, permit research about the functions the gene influences and how its expression is controlled.
In an empirical study of patent practice in the Australian medical biotechnology industry undertaken in 2002-2003, two of the authors found that there was a de facto research exemption from infringement, in the sense that owners of gene and other research tool patents tended not to enforce their rights against research users. 225 The one reported exception to this norm related to the polymerase chain reaction patent. These findings were largely affirmed in another empirical study by the authors and 584 r Patenting nature compulsory licensing for dependent patents where a new product involves an important technical advance of considerable economic significance on the invention on which it is dependent. Applications for compulsory licenses must be made to the Federal Court of Australia. 235 To date, three applications have been made, and all have met with very limited success. 236 There are also provisions in ss 163 to 170 of the Patents Act 1990, allowing for exploitation of patents by the Crown or by a person authorized by the Crown, as well as compulsory acquisition (s 171) and assignment (s 172). Use by the Crown under s 163 is limited to exploitation 'for the services of the Commonwealth or State', where that exploitation is 'necessary for the provision of those services'. There is no requirement for the Crown to formally apply for an order to exploit a patented invention. Section 165A does, however, provide a safeguard in that the patentee or their nominee can make application for a declaration that such exploitation is not, or is no longer, necessary for the proper provision of relevant services, as well as an order for the Crown to cease exploitation. Consequently, the government remains accountable as to the appropriate compensation and circumstances of use. 237 Like compulsory licensing, there has been limited use of these provisions, although two cases have shown that the provisions cover such things as the use by a state rail authority of an invention for the construction of rail carriages, 238 and the use by a local government authority of a meter relating to measurement of water supply. 239 As with compulsory licensing, compensation must be paid to the patentee by the Crown. Although the public laboratories undertaking BRCA testing did not explicitly rely on Crown use, it was widely understood that they could use this option should they need to, if a cease and desist letter was ever handed to them. Ultimately we will never know whether this 'threat' played a part in GTG's decision to cease enforcement of the BRCA patents.
The provisions were considered by the Australian Law Reform Commission ('ALRC') during its inquiry into gene patenting and human health completed in 2004, 240 and were again comprehensively examined by the Productivity Commission in 2013. 241 There was general consensus in both final reports that the Crown use provisions would apply when access to a patented invention is sought to facilitate the provision of public healthcare. 242 The ALRC specifically referred to the provision of genetic testing to members of the public, by a public laboratory as one example of such Crown use. There has been further suggestion that the supply of a patented drug to patients in a public hospital would satisfy the Crown use threshold under the Australian legislation, as the provision of a service to the public would constitute an act done in the the public interest would be disserved by enjoining the defendant's infringing activity. 264 Were the impact of market-clearing and researcher-clearing activity of the patent holder understood to constitute reason to deny injunctions, patent holders would become more amenable to negotiating licenses on reasonable terms.
Admittedly, decreasing the scope of patent protection could reduce incentives to innovate. However, the impact of the approaches suggested above is surely less harmful than the effect of denying patent protection entirely, as per Myriad and Mayo. It is also better than the current practice of inconsistent denials and awards of patent rights-an approach that combines inefficient incentives with harm to the public. Moreover, empirical evidence tends to suggest that concerns about incentives are exaggerated. Licenses issued in antitrust cases have not, apparently, discouraged innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. 265 And Mayo does not appear to have affected the development of new diagnostics, even though (as suggested earlier), the claims in issued patents are narrower.
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IV. CONCLUSION
To be sure, the Australian public health care system is not without its problems, but the availability and affordability of genetic diagnostic testing has never been one of those problems. The levels of interest and scrutiny the Myriad and Mayo decisions attracted in the United States have never really been reflected in Australia when comparator judgments were handed down. The essential reason for this is that far less hinged on these decisions: whereas Mayo and to a lesser extent Myriad had the potential for dramatic effects on rights over nature and fundamental science, D'Arcy was viewed more as an interesting diversion. Even Justice Beach's liberal judgment in Cargill failed to arouse significant concern, primarily because those involved in the industry take no great issue with method patents, and do not view them as a significant impediment to their activities.
While it would be impractical to attempt to replicate the Australian environment in the United States, there is no reason why some lessons can't be learned from the Australian experience with patenting nature. This article has argued that a number of aspects of Australian jurisprudence are worth considering: a more nuanced view of the judicial exceptions to patentability-one that better identifies claims that have significant potential to impede rather than promote progress-and a backup system that includes structural features of the relevant industries and safeguards to protect public welfare, such as rights to use patented genes and diagnostics to ensure unencumbered delivery of genetic diagnostic testing. At the very least, the Australian experience should provide some impetus to ask where and why the US system has gone awry, and if there really is sufficient interest in addressing its shortcomings, to prompt the examination of alternative approaches.
